Buck v. Bell Reborn
How Chiles v. Salazar Protects Eugenic Therapies as Speech
Dear Reader,
Conversion therapy is a thinly veiled excuse for child abuse, kidnapping, and torture.[1] It exists alongside other eugenic projects newly coined “pro-natalism” by Silicon Valley tech-oligarchs including Sam Altman, Peter Thiel, and Elon Musk. The pro-natalism movement scapegoats America’s problems onto a declining birthrate to recast the elite tech-oligarch class as modern-day Jesus Christs ready to save America with newfangled technologies.
The complete absurdity of the entire pro-natalist movement, especially Elon Musk’s insemination of “a legion” of women to carry on his genes,[2] seems taken straight out of the pages of Robert and Michelle King’s cancelled-too-soon television show Evil. The self-idolatry these tech-giants propose makes technology humanity’s savior in the place of Jesus Christ. In fact, Peter Thiel recently took his apocalyptic lectures from San Francisco to the threshold of the Vatican in Rome to propose that the “anti-Christ” is basically anyone who opposes the spy technology services he is selling to the world for billions.
Beloved Bay Area author Anne Lamott once said: “[Y]ou can safely assume you’ve created God in your own image when it turns out that God hates all the same people you do.”[3] Lamott often compassionately included herself in the category of people who are tempted and sometimes fail to do better than projecting their own hatreds onto God. But Mr. Thiel seems to reach heights of blasphemy Lamott did not fathom. In a league of his own, Thiel is projecting hatreds that are backed with billions of dollars derived from oligarchical status few could imagine.
It is notable that Sam Altman and Peter Thiel are openly homosexual. Sam Altman and Peter Thiel are a betraying their own community by supporting the pro-natalism that created conversion therapy to make all gay people either trapped in straight relationships, sterilized, castrated, or euthanized, all of which the Nazis did previously. The betrayal is especially decisive for Peter Thiel, as he apparently proves that German boys taken to America at a young age never had to learn a history lesson about the night of the long knives.
It is also notable that Elon Musk and Peter Thiel have immigration stories that point to the artificiality of the pro-natalist scapegoat of a declining birthrate as the cause of a panoply of American problems. The United States is, and has ever been, a nation of immigrants that has always counted on an influx of immigrants to enrich the nation.[4] As proven by economic studies (Clemens, Card), one of which won the Nobel prize, it is extremely likely, the only way there is an existential crisis caused by a falling birthrate, is if there were a nationwide anti-immigrant program that artificially blocked out new talent, demand, ingenuity, culture, and perspectives from reaching our shores — a program like Trump’s mass deportation machine.
Therefore, the pro-natalist movement is actually a dystopian, nanny-state, big brother solution to a problem created by the government’s general exclusion of immigrants that began in 1924. It has obvious roots in the white supremacist Chinese Exclusion laws that began with the Page Act, an anti-miscegenation law.[5] The anti-miscegenation goals of the Page Act were extended domestically in the White Slave Traffic Act (a.k.a. the Mann Act) prior to the 1924 general expansion of the immigration law to all comers.[6]
Dave Chappelle recently called America’s attention to the White Slave Traffic Act in light of P. Diddy’s recent White Slave Traffic Act conviction. That law presumes that potentially the only thing wrong with trafficking a white woman is that it depreciates the woman’s value to the white men who own her.[7] Diddy violated an anti-miscegenation, pro-natalist, part of the immigration law, and it appears that his lewd and violent behavior with women was used as enough of a reason to keep around an odious law based in a history of bigotry, racism, and misogyny.[8]
The basic problem with these anti-miscegenation laws from the Page Act to the White Slave Traffic Act, is that they treat women as property in any case. The laws are not on the books to preclude the enslavement of women, if enslavement is defined as making a person into a chattel.[9] They were on the books to distance American institutions from their foundations in African American chattel slavery, while ensuring all women (potentially) were properly kept the chattel of white men through marriage, parentage, or employment.[10]
Such eugenic laws are still on the books and are being used in high profile cases as though they do not entirely undermine women-led social justice movements in America. Given the appearance that social justice advocates still generally support these laws through their “by any means necessary” style of advocacy, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court decided that conversion therapy is a First Amendment protected viewpoint in Chiles v. Salazar. In Chiles, the Court seemed to think that abusing people with conversion therapy would be “the best means for discovering truth,” which can now be extended to protect renewed efforts at euthanasia and non-consensual sterilization for the purpose of discovering truth.[11]
Medical schools still teach facts learned from Nazi experiments done on live subjects that may not have been discovered otherwise. Is the truth a valid justification for these crimes against humanity? Chiles seems to think so.
Even after several authors confessed America’s shameful invention of eugenics that inspired the Nazis, the Supreme Court thinks eugenics offered as private services is valid. The Court appeared to think achieving patient goals were enough of a nod to consumerism to validate a judicial dispensation of State law.[12] However, there are a panoply of dangerous and life-threatening patient goals that medical doctors, psychologists and counselors are ethically and criminally barred from helping patients achieve.[13]
By using the First Amendment to erode the law’s ability to protect the public from quacks and worse, Chiles reveals the link between Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s opinion in Buck v. Bell, and his importation of the “marketplace of ideas” ideology into America in Abrams v. United States. The individuals who the marketplace assists in discovering the truth are not ordinary Americans, and they certainly are not those who were designated as imbeciles and retards, like Carrie Buck. Judging from his horrific decision in United States v. Holte, Justice Holmes thought that experimenting on women in the lower classes, like Dr. Frankenstein did to his monster, was one of the basic benefits of interpreting the First Amendment as a bulwark for the marketplace of ideas.[14]
Thus, the fact that the First Amendment was not meant to protect fraudulent or violent speech is qualified in cases like Chiles and Buck to only safeguard the elite, to help them in their quest for the “truth.” The First Amendment protects fraudulent and violent speech that horrifically experiments on Black, brown, female, and homosexual Americans. That is the rule extended in Chiles.
The fact that the First Amendment is being remade into something that was only ever meant to benefit the elite should offend everyone and everything. Among other things, the Chiles ruling offends:
Federal jurisdiction, because the plaintiff’s claims were unripe and Colorado’s law was not a credible threat despite Chiles’ extension of the Court’s new and widely criticized hypothetical-gay-man-is-a-credible-threat jurisdiction from 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis;
The separation of powers, because Chiles’ holdings amount to judge-made law that extend prospective remedies that avoid the “credible threat” that the plaintiff would have experienced damages the Court imagined she would if the Court did not grant this relief, effectively preempting and superseding potential legislative and regulatory solutions that Colorado and/or the federal government might have devised;[15]
The prohibition on advisory statements for similar reasons;[16]
Federalism and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments for similar reasons;[17]
State sovereignty, for similar reasons, as more fully explained in Justice Jackson’s dissent;[18]
The anti-feudal common law mandated by the U.S. Constitution;[19] and
The First Amendment limitations explicitly named in Chiles that fraudulent and violent speech is unprotected.[20]
In Trump v. Barbara the Supreme Court has an opportunity to effectively deprive, or at least strictly narrow, the Court’s Chiles jurisdiction by properly interpreting United States v. Wong Kim Ark as a repudiation of the Slaughter-House Cases. The proper test that should have been applied in Barbara was given in McCulloch v. Maryland as recently extended in NFIB v. Sebelius to uphold most of Obamacare despite the traditional role of the states in regulating health law. But the parties in Barbara did not properly argue these issues or claim privileges and immunities imported from the law of nations to protect all inhabitants of the United States as they might have according to the analysis given in my three part series Embracing the Stranger.
Without an argument against it, we can expect the Court to keep building upon paradoxical feudalistic laws, as though feudalism were common law in America, to allow the President to dismantle immigration and naturalization laws while protecting the abuse and torture of non-straight people as therapy. In time, the Court may validate illegal deportation, repatriation, and immigrant detention as a First Amendment protected form of therapy, for the immigrants’ own good. Unless some striking leaders rise to help Americans change the course of human events, it is unlikely that the American public will adequately contend with the serious potential extension of Chiles to support euthanasia and non-consensual sterilization of disfavored groups as First Amendment protect speech in the hideous style of Virginia v. Black.
Yours Respectfully,
Joshua J. Schroeder, Esq.
[1] See Ferguson v. JONAH, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS *1, *2 (2019).
[2] Mark 5:9; Luke 8:30.
[3] Anne Lamott, Bird by Bird 22 (1994).
[4] 2 Collected Works of James Wilson 1048 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) (“‘The shutting out of aliens,’ says [Lord Hale], ‘tends to the loss of people, which, laboriously employed, are the true riches of any country.’” (quoting source omitted)).
[5] United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 403 (1908) (holding that women could only be imported for moral purposes).
[6] 8 U.S.C. § 1557; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424.
[7] Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (following Bitty to describe the transport of women as though they are property rather than people even when the laws are followed); see United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 145 (1915) (holding women criminally liable for conspiring in the crime of interstate travel for immoral purposes). The Justice Department website suggests that Holte was cured by Gebardi, but this suggestion reveals how the Justice Department failed to conceive of the main problem in both Holte and Gebardi. The primary problem in both cases is that the Mann Act presumes women are the chattel of white men, and this was not cured, changed or modified by Gebardi’s improvement of protecting women from being charged with conspiracy in the process of their own enslavement. Archives: U.S. Dep’t of Justice Webpage, 2027. Mann Act, https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2027-mann-act (last accessed on Apr. 7, 2026).
[8] United States v. Combs, slip op., 24-CR-542, at 14–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2026). Cases such as Diddy’s sometimes emphasize the “dominant purpose” intent that Courts have inferred into the Mann Act as curative of the constitutional issues with the law. Id. at 13; but see United States v. Flucas, 22 F.4th 1149, 1166 (9th Cir. 2022) (Bybee, J., dissenting). But the issue of intent does not even touch the structural problem of immigration enforcement investigating U.S. citizens traveling within the country or the issue of whether Congress unconstitutionally made women property by statute, which should be tended to more carefully now that the President is occupying localities throughout the nation with ICE officials who have assassinated U.S. citizens including Alex Pretti and Renée Good. Combs, 24-CR-542, at 10–11 (noting that potentially any statute that designates interstate transportation of contraband is constitutional despite the fact that the contraband transported here are people, not contraband).
[9] See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121 (1932) (“Congress set out in the Mann Act to deal with cases which frequently, if not normally, involve consent and agreement on the part of the woman to the forbidden transportation.”).
[10] See Lorelei Lee, The Roots of “Modern Day Slavery”: The Page Act and the Mann Act, 52 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 1199, 1238 (2021).
[11] However unlikely, Chiles could potentially reverse Diddy’s sex crimes. Combs, 24-CR-542, at 11–13 (noting the denial of Diddy’s First Amendment arguments prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chiles). In cases like Brandenburg v. Ohio, National Socialist Party v. Skokie, Virginia v. Black, and Snyder v. Phelps, the Court seemed to relativize viewpoint protection to the point where the genocidal viewpoints of Nazis, the KKK, and religious fundamentalists became First Amendment protected speech.
[12] Chiles v. Salazar, slip op., No. 24-539, at 4 (2026). Such dispensations of the law were anciently reserved to the chief executive, i.e., the king, who was allowed to dispense with wrongs—a power that caused a constitutional crisis that ended when William & Mary deposed King James II in an event known as the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Sir John Fyneux on Dispensations (1495), Sir Walter Raleigh’s Case (1605), Thomas v. Sorrell (1674), Godden v. Hales (1686), and Sir Thomas Grantham’s Case (1687), 3 Mod. 120, in John Baker, Sources of English Legal History: Public Law to 1750, at 91–100, 453 (2024); see Holly Brewer, Creating a Common Law of Slavery for England and Its New World Empire, 39 L. & Hist. Rev. 765, 804 (2021).
[13] Bad doctors and big pharma regularly face harsh prison sentences for running pill mills that made billions for drug companies who developed and sold Fentanyl and Oxycodone among other addictive drugs.
[14] Joshua J. Schroeder, Pure//Evil Part One: How Evil is Popularized as Truth in the Marketplace of Ideas, 59 UIC L. Rev. 58, 196 (2025) (addressing how the marketplace of ideas ideology facilitates tyranny).
[15] Conversion therapy bans are not a credible threat to First Amendment protected speech, because conversion therapy is not being regulated as a viewpoint, but as a therapy. Thereby, there is no risk to the prior restraint of the plaintiff’s expression of her apparent viewpoints that homosexuality is a sin, or a crime, or an abomination, because she can fully express these viewpoints still, even to her clients—because conversion therapy is not the expression of these viewpoints. Conversion therapy is an attempt to thwart homosexuality through what is widely considered fraud, torture, and abuse based on junk science. Moreover, through the groundbreaking explorations of Heather Gay in the context of the Mormon Church, it appears that conversion therapy facilitates and covers up widespread abuse and rape of boys and girls within the structures of religious institutions in America.
The fact that the Supreme Court found that Colorado’s conversion therapy ban is a “credible threat” does not change the fact and reality that it is not, which is an existential problem for the Court. The Court should try to address this problem, because when the Court previously entered such a delusive state of decision-making Chief Justice Taney issued Ableman v. Booth, ordering Wisconsin to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the Fugitive Slaves Act of 1850. Soon thereafter, Ableman was embarrassed by Congress’s repealing of the Act on June 28, 1864 as an abomination and embarrassment to the American concept of liberty. The Roberts Court may soon find itself the butt of Congress and States’ agreement that Chiles is the real abomination here, because the regulation of professions is not a viewpoint regulation even if it incidentally regulates speech-as-therapy. Chiles, No. 24-539, at 9–10 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
[16] Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Jay Court precedent as the proper basis to preclude the Court from providing a gloss on the constitution that life is meant to provide). The Chiles Court followed the recent advisory statements of the Supreme Court in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, NLRB v. Noel Canning, and probably other cases that were derived from a bastardization of Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Youngstown that may later be narrowed and distinguished according to their deficient facts and clearly erroneous interpretation of Frankfurter’s opinion. The Chiles Court followed 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis to issue what appears to be an advisory opinion about fines and penalties Colorado might have, but did not, pursue against the plaintiff. To get around the ripeness bar to jurisdiction, the Court found that the Colorado law was reviewable as a “credible threat” against the plaintiff’s free speech rights.
[17] The Chiles Court transformed the First Amendment into a safe-harbor to avoid the risk of incurring civil penalties and fines related to prohibited speech in the course of regulated professional conduct. Though speech may be encompassed in regulated professional conduct, the risk of fines and penalties for engaging in prohibited professional conduct that may include certain forms of speech is only applicable as regulation of professional conduct to which speech is entirely incidental. The Colorado law did not censor speech as speech, which Justice Jackson appeared to believe should have been the deciding factor according to her dissent. Chiles, No. 24-539, at 9–10 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
[18] Chiles, No. 24-539, at 1 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]here is no right to practice medicine which is not subordinate to the power of the States.’” (quoting Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926))). In the context of professional regulation, where wrongs tend to be malum prohibitum, the State usually has the sovereign power to dispense with wrongs on a case-by-case basis. Colorado appeared to have dispensed with penalizing the plaintiff’s wrongs in Chiles, at least for the time being. By issuing an advisory opinion to decide what would happen if Colorado decided to penalize the plaintiff in Chiles, the Court violated the State’s sovereign power to regulate professions including the decision of how and when to enforce its regulations.
[19] Chiles dispensed of risks of incurring civil penalties for malum prohibitum, i.e., human made wrongs, by interpreting penalties for engaging in unlawful professional conduct that may involve speech as regulation of a First Amendment protected viewpoint. This apparent usurpation of the State’s sovereignty was not cured by the plaintiff’s claim in Chiles that the plaintiff was helping her patients achieve their own goals. For one, the plaintiff’s patients are likely minors who have not become self-sufficient and necessarily depend upon adult guardians for their survival. The goals of patient minors may merely be the goals of their parents who may not, and likely do not, represent the actual goals of minor patients.
In the category of licensure cases of which Chiles is a part, the Court usurped State powers to dispense with malum prohibitum wrongs by prospectively dispensing with potentially an entire category of wrong that was prohibited by the legislature of Colorado. This kind of prosecutorial discretion that sits in the executive branch of the state and federal governments was derived by the king’s discretion in England as the chief executive, which eventually created a constitutional crisis in England symbolized by Godden v. Hales. In Chiles, the Court, rather than the executive, exerted the power of the king, or other chief executive, by dispensing with malum prohibitum wrongs involving a state license. The Court’s exertion of the powers of a king is therefore extremely suspect under the anti-feudal U.S. Constitution and U.S. Declaration of Independence.
[20] Chiles, No. 24-539, at 9 (“[T]his Court has recognized a ‘few historic and traditional categories of expression long familiar to the bar’ where content-based restrictions on speech will not automatically trigger strict scrutiny—categories that include fraud, defamation, and ‘fighting words.’ United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion).”).